We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality of mutual contracts for risk sharing under constraints on premiums or utility functions of participants of the agreement. These conditions are an extension of those of the Borch, Gerber and Bühlmann-Jewell ones. Some applications to optimal insurance contracts, optimal dividend sharing and optimal reinsurance are given.
INTRODUCTION
A mutual agreement of n companies will be considered in the paper. Let X i denote a wealth which is reported to redistribution by ith participant of the agreement. We assume that X i is a random variable defined on a given probability space (W, S, ‫,)ސ‬ which may take negative values with positive probability.
Let X = X 1 + … + X n be the global wealth. Throughout the paper, the notation X =Y and X < Y means ‫(ސ‬X =Y) = 1 and ‫(ސ‬X < Y) = 1, respectively. We write R i for a part of the global wealth redistributed to ith participant of the agreement. The sequence of random variables (R i ) = (R i , …, R n ) will be called a sharing rule if the clearing condition is satisfied:
. For instance, in reinsurance X 1 = -Y, X 2 = 0, R 1 = R -Y -P, and R 2 = P -R, where Y denotes the aggregate claim amount of the first insurer, R = R (Y) denotes a compensation paid by the reinsurer, and P stands for a reinsurer's premium.
How to determine optimal rules for sharing risks and constructing reinsurance treaties? The classical results are due to de Finetti (1940) . De Finetti derived relative retention levels which have simple forms by considering the insurer's net (of reinsurance) profit from the portfolio at the end of a given time period. He then minimized the variance of this profit subject to its expected value being fixed. See also Bühlmann (1996) , Section 5.2, and Ammeter et al. (1959) for a review of ealier works of Medolaghi, Ottaviani and others.
In the seminal paper of Borch (1962) another method is presented. Borch adapted the von Neumann-Morgernstern utility theory to actuarial science and proposed criteria based on the concept of utility function For an excellent overview of the expected utility theory, we refer the reader to Panjer et al. (1998) and Gollier (2001) . We now provide the essential points of Borch's results. More details, and proofs, can be found in Borch (1974 Borch ( , 1990 . Assume preferences of ith participant can be described by a utility function, say u i . The common examples are the
• exponential utility function with index ␣ u ␣ (x) = ␣ 1 (1 -e -␣x ), x ∈ ‫,ޒ‬ ␣ > 0; this function yields a constant risk aversion,
• logarithmic utility function u(x) = lnx, x > 0; the risk aversion is decreasing • power utility function of the second kind, u(x) = c 1 (x c -1), x > 0, 0 < c < 1; the risk aversion is a decreasing function of wealth. Borch (1962) proposed to choose a Pareto-optimal risk sharing as an optimal one. We say that the rule (R i ) is Pareto-optimal if there is no rule (R i ) such that ‫ޅ‬u i (R i ) ≥ ‫ޅ‬u i (R i ) for all i with strict inequality for some i. It is well known that if the rule (R i ) is a solution of the following constrained optimization problem with positive reals (k i ), it is Pareto-optimal (see e.g. Gerber, 1979, p. 90 , for a geometric justification). Borch showed that (R i ) solves the problem (1.1) if and only if the Borch condition holds: k i uЈ i (R i ) = k n uЈ n (R n ) for all i (for the proof see e.g. Gerber and Pafumi, 1999) . Denote by D f the domain of the function f and suppose the support of X is contained in D u 1 +… +D u n = {x 1 + … + x n ; x i ∈ D u i }. From the Borch condition it follows that if (u i ) are differentiable and strictly concave and if uЈ i (D u i ) = (0, ∞) for all i, then the solution of the problem (1.1) is given by
where u * i and h * denotes, respectively, the inverse function of uЈ i and Pesonen, 1984 , Wyler, 1990 ). Borch's result was extended by Deprez and Gerber (1985) who considered minimization of i 1 
and b i , called a side payment, depends on k i (see e.g. Gerber and Pafumi, 1999) . Because the side payments must sum to zero, there are some companies making payments to others even when all losses are zero.
To remove this disadvantage Gerber (1978) and Bühlmann and Jewell (1979) proposed to include side constraints on R i . Define 
where U = (∞) and L = (X i -c i ) with nonnegative reals (c i ) if and only if (R i ) satisfies the Gerber condition:
(see also Gerber, 1979) . In this framework, company i is not willing to pay more that c i toward losses of other companies. Bühlmann and Jewell (1979) stated that a rule (R i ) is a solution of the problem (1.5) with L = (0) if and only if the Bühlmann-Jewell condition holds: there exist a positive random variable L and positive constants (k i ) such that for i = 1, 2, …, n
The Bühlmann-Jewell constraint L = (0) can be explained as follows: company i is not ready to lose more than its total wealth in the worst. For L = (0) and U = (∞), they also found the following explicit solution of (1.5):
in which u * i and h * denotes, respectively, the inverse function of uЈ i and
In actuarial literature one can find a few methods of choosing coefficients (k i ) in (1.2) or (1.6). The individual rationality condition says that the coefficients
There are many Pareto-optimal rules violating this condition. Furthermore, the condition may not provide exactly one solution. For instance, from the extended Borch condition it follows that the solution of the problem Another proposition one can find in Bühlmann (1984) . He suggested to choose (k i ) according to the nonprofit condition which says that no company should profit at the expense of the others. Let (R i ) be defined by (1.2). Under some regularity assumptions like the boundedness of (X i ), Bühlmann (1984) proved that there exists a sequence (k i ) such that ‫(ޅ‬R i C) = ‫(ޅ‬X i C) for all i. Herein C is a positive random variable such that ‫ޅ‬C = 1. The principle P = ‫(ޅ‬X i C) is called the economic principle and C is said the price density. Bühlmann and Jewell (1979) also stated that under some mild assumptions there exists a sequence (k i ) such that ‫(ޅ‬R i C) = ‫(ޅ‬X i C) for all i, where (R i ) is given by (1.6) and C is a price density (see also Lienhard, 1986 , Aase, 1993 . Other propositions based on ideas from the game theory have also appeared in actuarial literature. For n = 2 Borch suggested to use the Nash solution of the bargain problem (see also Lemaire and Quairiere, 1986) . The Kalai-Smorodinski solution is described in Lemaire (1991) along with a comprehensive review of other methods.
The aim of the paper is to provide an extension of both the Gerber condition and the Bühlmann-Jewell condition, see Section 2. In Section 3 one can find some applications of the result of Section 2. All the results presented in the paper are derived from elementary properties of convex functions and the Brouwer fixed point theorem.
MAIN RESULT
Let X i denote a set of random variables defined on (W, S, ‫)ސ‬ for i = 1,2,…,n.
Let P be a mapping from X = X i ≈ … ≈ X n into the real numbers. The mapping P is called a C-functional at (X i ) if there exists a random vector on W, say
The random variable PЈ 1 will be called an ith partial subderivative of P at (X j ). Any functional P satisfying (2.1) for each (X i ) ∈ X will be called a C-functional.
Examples:
2.1. Letting p i (X i ) be a concave and Gâteaux differentiable functional, the mapping P =
, where p Ј i means the Gâteaux derivative of p i (see Deprez and Gerber, 1999) .
2.2.
Suppose w is a concave and nondifferentiable function on ‫.ޒ‬ Let w Ј -and w Ј + stand for the left derivative and the right derivative of w, respectively. Both derivatives exist at any point from the interior of the domain of w and ‫ޅ‬w(Y ) Rockafellar, 1970) . Although the mapping P =
2.3. Suppose P attains its maximum at (X * j ). Then P is a C-functional at (X * j ) and PЈ i = 0 for all i.
Remark 2.1. If P is a C-functional then P is a concave mapping, i.e. ␣P(X) + (1-␣)P(Y) ≤ P(␣X+ (1-␣)Y) for all 0 < ␣ < 1, where X = (X j ) and Y = (Y j ). This follows directly from the inequalities:
Given a functional P, we find a solution of the constrained optimization problem:
where H i is a real-valued functional on X i , -∞ < L i ≤ U i < ∞ are given random variables, and (P i ) are fixed reals. Throughout the paper, 1 A denotes the indicator function of A.
Theorem 1. (a) Assume there exist a rule (R
and nonnegative reals c 1 ,…,c n -1 such that P and (H i ) are C-functionals at (R i ) and for i ≤ n -1:
is a solution of the problem (2.2).
(b) Suppose P and (H i ) are concave and Gâteaux differentiable. Suppose (R i ) is a solution of (2.2) satisfying conditions (iii) and (iv) and suppose also that one of the following two assumptions holds:
and H i is increasing and continuous functional for i
for every (R i ) ∈ R . From conditions (i) and (ii) it follows that equality occurs in (2.5) if R i = R i . As a consequence of concavity of H i and condition (iii), we obtain
for every (R i ) ∈ R . Combining (2.4), (2.5), and (2.6) yields
As a consequence of (2.7) and (2.8), P(R 1 ,…, R n ) ≤ P(R 1 , …, R n ) for every (R i ) ∈ R , which completes the proof of part (a) of Theorem 1.
(b) Let (R i ) be a solution of the problem (2.2) satisfying conditions (iii) and (iv). Fix any i, i ≤ n -1, and define (R (t) j ) as follows:
where t ∈ (0,1) and
has a maximum at t = 0 and is concave. Hence f Ј + (0) ≤ 0, where f Ј + (0) denotes the right-hand derivative of f at 0. This implies
Let assumption A1 be fulfilled. Put
This implies that conditions (i)-(ii) hold, which completes the proof under assumption A1. Let assumption A2 be fulfilled. Put
(2.10)
, which leads to a contradiction with (2.11). The proof is complete. ¡ Remark 2.2. Theorem 1 (a) still holds with the problem (2.2) replaced by the following one:
Hence conditions (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1 are equivalent to the following ones:
In a similar manner as in the proof of Theorem 1 we may easily show that conditions (i)-(ii) of Theorem 1 have to be replaced by:
. This extends the Gerber condition. In fact, putting
. For H i = P i = 0 we obtain the extended Borch condition.
APPLICATIONS

Extension of Bühlmann result
As mentioned in Section 1 of the paper, Bühlmann (1984) proved that if the sequence (X i ) is assumed to be bounded and if the Lipschitz condition is imposed on the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion function r i defined by r i = -u Љ i / uЈ i , then there exists a solution of (1.1), say (R i ), which satisfies the nonprofit condition with the economic principle. We now extend this result to cover the case of other premium principles. We first prove the result of Bühlmann for economic principle without restrictive assumptions on (X i ) and r i .
Theorem 2.
Assume all u i are differentiable and strictly concave on ‫,ޒ‬ assume uЈ i ‫)ޒ(‬ = (0,∞) for all i, and assume max 1 ≤ i ≤ n ‫|ޅ‬X i C| < ∞. Then there are coefficients (k i ) such that ‫(ޅ‬R i C) = ‫(ޅ‬X i C) for i =1,2,…,n, where (R i ) is a solution of (1.1).
Proof. Observe that it is enough to prove that ‫(ޅ‬R i C) = ‫(ޅ‬X i C) for i ≤ n -1 because of the clearing condition. Define the map F = (F 1 ,…,F n -1 ) from ‫ޒ‬ n -1 to ‫ޒ‬ n -1 as follows:
, where R i is the solution of the problem (1.1) such that R i (0) = x i (cf. Bühlmann, 1984) . Clearly,
We now show that any solution of (1.1) satisfies the Lipschitz condition with constant 1, i.e. |R i (x) -R i (0)| ≤ |x| for all x. Obviously, it is enough to show that both the functions x → R i (x) and x → x -R i (x) are increasing for each i.
Recall that uЈ i is decreasing. Since the composition of two decreasing function is increasing, x → R i (x) is increasing. Since (R j ) are increasing and uЈ i is decreasing, we have
y) for x < y, as expected. By the dominated convergence theorem and continuity of the function (x 1 ,…,x n ) → R i (x) for any fixed x and i, the map F is continuous. From the Lipschitz condition we get that for every
where R i is given by (3.1).
is a continuous function defined on a compact and convex set, the Brouwer theorem implies that there is a fixed point, say (
Remark 3.1. Theorem 2 also holds for other types of utility function. For instance, if u i (x) = lnx for all i, then a solution of (1.1) satisfying the nonprofit condition is given by
We now provide a Bühlmann type result for premiums of the form H i (X) = ‫ޅ‬X + h i (‫ބ‬X), where h i is a nondecreasing differentiable and convex function defined on [0,∞) and h i (0) = 0. Examples include the standard deviation principle, the variance principle, and the mixed principle (cf. Section 3.5 of the paper).
Theorem 3.
Suppose 0 < ‫ބ‬X < ∞. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 there exist coefficients (k i ) such that the solution of (1.1), say (R i ), satisfies the condition
, where R i (0) = x i for each i. It is easy to check that the principle H i (X) = -‫ޅ‬X -h i (‫ބ‬X) with a differentiable and convex function h i is a C-functional and HЈ i,X = -1 -hЈ i (‫ބ‬X)(X -‫ޅ‬X)/‫ބ‬X for ‫ބ‬X > 0 and HЈ i,X = -1 otherwise. Therefore
(see Deprez and Gerber, 1985, Theorem 8) . Herein HЈ i = HЈ i,R i . Hence for every 
for every solution of (1.1) such that R i (0) = x i . Furthermore, if ‫ބ‬R i = 0 then by the Lipschitz condition
From the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the inequality (x + y) 2 ≤ 2(x 2 + y 2 ), and the Lipschitz condition it follows
By the Lipschitz condition
Combining (3.6)-(3.8) with the assumption that hЈ is nondecreasing yields
From (3.3)-(3.5) and (3.9) it follows that for every (R i ) satisfying (1.1) with
with some reals m i . Moreover, H i is continuous, i.e.
By the Brouwer theorem, there is a fixed point, say (
Theorem 3 also applies to the following premium calculation principles:
• exponential principle
• covariance principle
• Dutch principle
among others. For instance, if the i th insurer uses the exponential principle with the index b i then it is enough to show that there is a sharing rule, say
Following similar lines as in the proof of Theorem 3 we obtain that
The rest of the proof is straightforward. It is worth to emphasize that the rule (1.2) may not satisfy the nonprofit condition for i = n. 
Suppose H i (X) = H(X) for all i,
where H is an additive and comonotonic premium principle, that is,
An example is the exponential principle. Property (ii) follows from the wellknown inequality: ‫ޅ‬f(X)‫ޅ‬g(X) ≤ ‫(ޅ‬f(X)g(X)) for all nondecreasing functions f,g such that the expectations exist (see e.g. Rolski et al., 1999) . Suppose Theorem 3 holds for (H i ) with H i = H for all i and suppose the risks (X i ) are independent. Then there is a rule (R i ) such that H(R i ) = H(X i ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n -1 and
Pool
Consider n insurance companies which would like to exchange reinsurance. Let X i stand for the aggregate claim amount of the ith company. The premium of the company is calculated according to the expected value principle with the safety loading coefficient b i , i.e. P i = (1 + b i )‫ޅ‬X i . The companies seek for a risk exchange (R i ) such that the sum of variances of retained risks will be as small as possible provided the nonprofit condition is fulfilled, that is, 
Then a solution of the problem (3.11) is given by
R * i (X) = (h * (X) -b i ) + for i = 1,2,…,n,
where h * is the inverse function of h(x) defined by h(x) =
Proof. In Theorem 1 (a) we put P = i 1 = ‫ބ‬ n 2 -! R i and H i = P i -(1 + b i )‫ޅ‬R i for i = 1,2,…,n (see Remark 2.2). The extended Gerber condition is as follows:
Obviously, 
We omit the details. ¡
Optimal insurance
Suppose insurance is written on the aggregate loss, i.e. the insurer covers R = R(X) and the insured covers X -R, where X means the global risk and R means a random variable defined on (W, S, ‫,)ސ‬ called the compensation rule. Assume the insurer uses the expected value principle of premium calculation with a safety loading coefficient b > 0. Given an insurer's premium P, the policyholder has a wealth m after paying for insurance and wants to have an arrangement which maximizes a utility function of his retained risk under a restriction on insurer's cover, namely, L ≤ R ≤ U, where L,U are random variables such that 0 ≤ L ≤ U. Hence the following problem arises 12) in which u is a increasing differentiable and concave function. A solution of the problem (3.12) with L = 0 and U = X was given by Arrow (1963) . Throughout the paper we use the following notation
Όa UL = min{U, max{L,a}}.
Theorem 5.
Suppose ‫ޅ‬L < P ≤ ‫ޅ‬U. Then a solution of the problem (3.12) is the limited stop loss contract defined by R
* = ΌX -d UL ,
where d is a nonnegative real such that
Proof. See Pesonen (1984) or Daykin et al. (1994) for the proof via an extension of the Jensen inequality. ¡
We now provide an extension of Theorem 5. Suppose the policyholder is willing to have a contract which maximizes his utility function, say ‫ޅ‬u(m + R -X), while the insurer wants to have a contract such that ‫ޅ‬v(M -R) ≥ P, where v and M means the insurer's utility function and the insurer's wealth, respectively, and P is a fixed real. We assume that both the insured and the insurer are risk averse, i.e. u and v are differentiable increasing and concave functions. We also assume that u is strictly concave. This leads to the following problem
(cvЈ(t)) for c > 0. In order that u(t,c) would be well-defined
(3.14)
Theorem 6.
Assume ‫|(ޅ‬X | + |XuЈ(X)| + |XvЈ(X)|) < ∞ and assume ‫ޅ‬v (M -R 0+ ) < P < ‫ޅ‬v(M -R ∞ ). Then a solution of the problem (3.13) is the compensation rule R c defined by (3.14) with c being such that ‫ޅ‬v (M -R c ) = P.
Proof. We apply Theorem 1 (a) with n = 2,
and HЈ 1 = -vЈ(M -R). The Bühlmann-Jewell condition is as follows:
Define R c by (3.14). Clearly, (R c ) satisfies the Bühlmann-Jewell condition. We now show the existence of a real c such that 
. Herein d is a real such that P = ‫ޅ‬u b (M -R * ).
Example 3.4. Let the wealth of the insurer be greater than or equal to the wealth of the policyholder, i.e. m ≤ M. Suppose both the policyholder and the insurer use the logarithmic utility. Assume X < m and assume ‫ޅ‬log(M -U)
is the rule R c c X m c M 1
Example 3.5. Given 0 < ␣ < 1, let u(x) = ␣ 1 1
-(x 1-␣ -1), x > 0, be the common power utility function of the policyholder and the insurer. Assume that X < m ≤ M. From Theorem 6 we get that if ‫((ޅ‬M -U)
then a solution of the problem: where c is such that ‫ޅ‬u(M -R * ) = P.
Remark 3.2. Observe that in Examples 3.3-3.5 the optimal contract is a limited combination of a stop loss and quota share.
Dividends payments
Suppose the insurer offers a profit sharing plan to the policyholder because of the threat of self-insurance on the part of the good risks. He will refund some part of the profit he makes on the policy. Let R stand for the refund, let P denote the insurer's premium, and let X denote the total claim amount. Since the insurer refunds a part of the profit, one natural constraint on the set of all refunds is 0 ≤ R ≤ (P -X) + . More restrictive constraints are also of great actuarial interest. We assume
Denote by u and v utility function of the insured and the insurer, respectively. Adopt same assumptions for u and v and definition of u * as in Section 3.3. Given a real q, a solution of the following problem
is a Pareto-optimal dividends policy. The case when the insured is risk neutral (u is linear) was treated by Gerber and Jones (1974) . The work of Gerber and Jones was extended by Vandebroek (1988) who assumed that the insured is riskaverse (u is concave). In both cited papers, L = 0 and U = (P -X) + . We provide a further extension.
Theorem 7.
Let ‫|ޅ‬X|, ‫|ޅ‬XuЈ(X)|, and ‫|ޅ‬XvЈ(X)| be finite. 
Proof. Put in Theorem 1 (a): n = 2, R 1 = X -P +R, R 2 = P -R, P = ‫ޅ‬u(m -R 2 ), H 1 = ‫ޅ‬v(M -R 1 ), P 1 = q, L 1 = L + X -P, and U 1 = U + X -P. Clearly, P Ј 1 = 0, P Ј 2 = -uЈ(m -P +R), and HЈ 1 = -vЈ(M -X + P -R). The rest of the proof is omitted because it is extremely similar to that of Theorem 6. ¡ Example 3.6. Suppose both the insurer and the insured use the exponential utility function with index a and b, respectively. From Theorem 7 we get the following optimal dividend payments rule:
The later result is due to Vandebroek (1988) .
Optimal limited reinsurance
Assume that an insurer is exposed to a risk X and has decided to buy a reinsurance policy. By R we denote the part of X covered by reinsurer. The following reinsurance contracts on the basis of global claims are commonly treated in actuarial literature:
where a, b are parameters such that 0 < a ≤ 1 and b ≥ 0. We can find several papers on optimality of agreements 1-3 (see e.g. Gerber, 1979 , Deprez and Gerber, 1985 , Pesonen, 1984 , Samson, 1986 , Hesselager, 1990 , Hesselager, 1993 , Bühlmann, 1996 , Embrechts et al. 1997 , Rolski et al., 1999 , Young, 1999 , Kaluszka, 2001 , 2004 , and the references therein). Nevertheless, a lot of these results are only of theoretical value since in practice most insurance is sold with limited liability. Such an insurance contract is the limited stop loss defined by R = min{l,(X -b) + }, where l is a positive real, called the layer (cf. Gerathewohl, 1980 , Daykin et al., 1994 , Barile and Monti, 1995 . It seems that there are only few papers dealing with optimality of limited reinsurance contracts (see Sundt, 1991 , Walhin and Paris, 2000 , and Mata, 2000 .
We now adjust some well-known optimality results to the case of limited reinsurance. Suppose the cedent wants to minimize the variance of his part of the total claims under a fixed reinsurer's premium based on the mean and the variance of the compensated part of the risk, i.e.
where 0 ≤ L ≤ U ≤ X are given constraints and t → f(P,t) is decreasing and concave function such that f(P,0) = P. Examples include the
• standard deviation principle P = ‫ޅ‬R + b‫ބ‬R,
• variance principle
• mixed principle
• modified variance principle P = ‫ޅ‬R + b‫ބ‬ 2 R/‫ޅ‬R,
• quadratic utility principle
, where ␣,b,c > 0 (cf. Gerber, 1979 , Goovaerts et al., 1984 , and Bühlmann, 1996 among others). Theorem 8 extends Theorem 1.1 of Kaluszka (2001) . where f Ј 2 (P,t) = ∂f(P,t)/∂t. Then R * is a solution of (3.21).
Proof. Put n = 2, R 1 = R, R 2 = X -R, L 1 = L, U 1 = U, P = -‫ބ‬ 2 R 2 , P 1 = 0, and H 1 (R) = f(P,‫ބ‬R) -‫ޅ‬R in Theorem 1 (a) (see Remark 2.2). As a consequence of the inequalities: f(P,‫ބ‬R) ≤ f(P,‫ބ‬R) + f Ј 2 (P,‫ބ‬R)(‫ބ‬R -‫ބ‬R), ‫ބ‬R -‫ބ‬R ≥ ‫([ޅ‬R -‫ޅ‬R)(R -R)] /‫ބ‬R, and the assumption f Ј 2 (P,t) ≤ 0, we get ( ) 
